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Abstract
How do politicians in emerging democracies subvert institutional reforms that are designed to improve accountability?
Looking at patron-client relations within political parties, I present a strategy, partisan accountability, by which strong
parties undermine accountability to citizens. At the national level, parties build patronage networks. Central party
organizations use their power and resources to build political machines that extend to the local level. Leveraging these
patronage networks, national politicians co-opt local politicians into being accountable to central party interests over their
own constituents. I employ original subnational data from Bosnia and Herzegovina on party organization and mayoral
recalls from 2005 to 2015. The analysis shows that strong parties initiate recalls to install loyal, co-partisan mayors rather
than to sanction mayors for poor policy performance. This pattern demonstrates a strategy by which central party
organizations in competitive democracies stifle subnational democratization to consolidate power.
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Recent literature on democratic backsliding finds that
democratically elected leaders subvert political institutions
in order to consolidate power (Bermeo, 2016; Levitsky and
Ziblatt, 2018; Svolik, 2018). Despite extensive scholarship
on democratization and authoritarian regimes, however, we
lack general theories to explain this backsliding (Schedler,
2019; Waldner and Lust, 2018). As a result, we have insuf-
ficient understanding of the strategies that leaders use to
subvert democratic institutions, as well as the conse-
quences that these strategies have for political accountabil-
ity. How do politicians subvert institutional reforms that
were originally designed to improve accountability to cit-
izens? How do these strategies affect democratic account-
ability, defined as the ability of citizens to reward and
punish politicians for their performance in office?1 I inves-
tigate this question by analyzing the politics behind
mayoral recalls within an electoral democracy.
The recall mechanism is a democratic procedure
designed for citizens and municipal council members to
remove poor-performing mayors from office before the
completion of their terms through a popular vote. Evidence
from Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, shows that munic-
ipal councilors frequently initiate recalls against popular
mayors with impressive policy successes to their credit.
Furthermore, these recalls often have direct interference
from national-level parties and politicians. Factors that the
conventional wisdom would deem important—political
party competition and ethnic fragmentation—do not ade-
quately explain the observed patterns of recalls. Moreover,
influential scholarship expects robust and institutionalized
party competition to improve electoral accountability and
incentivize parties to adopt reforms that reduce state
exploitation (Berliner and Erlich, 2015; Grzymala-Busse,
2007; Mainwaring and Torcal, 2006; Schleiter and Voz-
naya, 2016; Vachudova, 2005). Yet the competitiveness
of subnational elections and party system stability do not
seem to restrain politicians from meddling in local demo-
cratic processes. It might also be tempting to interpret the
politics behind recalls in Bosnia as a legacy of ethnic
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conflict. Almost all cases, however, involve conflicts
between politicians from the same ethnic orientation,
which rules out ethnicity as the driving factor.
I explain the strategy by which dominant, national par-
ties subvert municipal democratic reforms, in the form of
recalls, to increase political power. At the national level,
parties leverage financial, organizational, and electoral
resources to build patronage networks. National-level pol-
iticians use these patronage networks to co-opt local poli-
ticians into being loyal to central party interests over local
community interests. This phenomenon, which I call parti-
san accountability, leads municipal councilors to be
accountable to central party leaders rather than to their
constituents. Partisan accountability explains two main pat-
terns of mayoral recalls in Bosnia and Herzegovina from
2005 to 2015: Municipal councilors from strong parties
initiate recalls to extend competition against vulnerable
mayors from rival parties, and they initiate recalls to punish
co-partisan mayors who are disloyal to central party inter-
ests. These patterns point to a broader strategy of demo-
cratic subversion in which dominant national parties install
loyal, co-partisan mayors to extend political and economic
control over subnational units. My approach therefore dif-
fers from literature on subnational authoritarianism, which
views the central state as a pro-democratic force that is
challenged by illiberal structures and practices at subna-
tional levels (Behrend and Whitehead, 2016; Gibson,
2005). Instead, I show a path by which central elites stifle
subnational democratization to aggrandize power.
Empirical studies of subnational recalls in developing
democracies are sparse; however, recent evidence from
Colombia and Peru suggests that they are frequently
manipulated by individual politicians for political gain and
have mixed effects on local democratic accountability
(Holland and Incio, 2019; Welp, 2016; Welp and Milanese,
2018). My work builds on this literature by examining
recalls in a different type of party system where the strength
of individual parties varies greatly. This context enables me
to identify a top-down strategy by which central leaders
from resource-rich parties influence local, co-partisan
municipal councilors to recall mayors whom leaders deem
unfavorable to party interests. As a result, patterns of sanc-
tioning local politicians become more reflective of political
favors and retribution than public policy outputs. Under-
standing how political party resources affect elite strategies
to extend power over subnational units therefore contri-
butes to our understanding of why many young democra-
cies display uneven and substandard performance, lagging
far behind de jure institutional reforms.
In the next section, I explain the logic of partisan
accountability. Following this I provide a background of
decentralization and party politics in Bosnia and Herzego-
vina before detailing the operationalization of variables and
my empirical strategy. Then I analyze the patterns of
mayoral recalls initiated between 2005 and 2015. Finally,
I conclude with a discussion of the implications for demo-
cratic subversion and avenues for future research.
Theory of partisan accountability
I explain how organizational resources provide incentives
and capacities for parties to break the accountability con-
nection between subnational governments and their citi-
zens in the form of mayoral recalls. Strong parties instead
favor partisan accountability, in which local politicians are
beholden to the interests of central party leaders. This argu-
ment applies to illiberal democracies, defined as regimes in
which elections may be competitive but political institu-
tions are weak, leading political actors to engage in infor-
mal practices that flout formal rules (Brinks et al., 2019;
Grzymala-Busse, 2010; Levitsky and Murillo, 2009;
O’Donnell, 1996). In addition, the party system should
contain at least one organizationally strong party that com-
petes in both national and subnational elections.
The main assumption is that political parties seek to
maximize political and economic power. One strategy to
achieve this goal is to extend control over subnational gov-
ernments by taking over mayoral positions. The second
assumption is that most parties in illiberal democracies
do not establish programmatic linkages with citizens. Pre-
vious research shows that parties in young democracies
find it less costly to win public support by targeting goods
to specific groups than to commit to policies that serve the
broad public interest (Keefer, 2007; Keefer and Vlaicu,
2008; Remmer, 2007).
Given the lack of programmatic parties in illiberal
democracies, strong parties use clientelism or patronage
rather than ideological agendas to aggrandize power. I
define patronage as a system in which patrons reward cli-
ents with material benefits in exchange for political sup-
port, or patrons punish clients’ lack of support by
withdrawing benefits. Classical party theories indeed
warned that the evolution of individual party organizations
leads the central leadership to concentrate power and prior-
itize office-seeking goals over ideology (Michels, 1959;
Panebianco, 1988; Weber, 1978). The combination of insti-
tutional weakness and strong party organization thus lends
itself to machine politics: Dominant parties influence the
enforcement of legislation through the distribution of par-
ticularistic, material rewards within their networks (Scott,
1969).
Scholars note that strong party organizations with net-
works of local branches are necessary to target material
benefits and to monitor political support (Kitschelt and
Kselman, 2013; Stokes, 2005). While research on cliente-
lism traditionally focuses on relationships between
politicians and citizens, the logic similarly applies to
patron-client relations within parties. In other words, orga-
nizational resources such as party finance, grassroots infra-
structure, and electoral representation, enhance capacities
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for intra-party patronage. Specifically, financial resources
and electoral representation provide career and monetary
incentives, such as public sector jobs and kickbacks that
central party officials dole out to reward loyal party mem-
bers or withhold to punish disloyal members. Local
branches therefore serve as infrastructure through which
central party actors monitor compliance and distribute
rewards and punishments to municipal politicians.
If central party officials from strong parties use patron-
age to command party discipline, then local politicians
have incentives to respond to party interests over their own
constituents. This is the core tradeoff between partisan and
democratic accountability that leads to the subversion of
mayoral recalls. Placing it in a principal-agent framework,
partisan accountability contrasts with democratic account-
ability in that the principals are central party officials
(rather than citizens) whose agents are their co-partisans
at the municipal level. Some critics may question how
dominant parties shirk responsiveness to citizens without
facing negative electoral consequences. As previous work
shows, the accumulated stocks of organizational and elec-
toral resources help parties to win elections, including
through clientelistic exchanges with voters (Kitschelt and
Kselman, 2013; Samuels and Zucco Jr, 2014; Tavits, 2013;
Van Dyck, 2014).
By contrast, local politicians from weak parties—those
that are organizationally undeveloped and not well-
positioned in national government—have greater incen-
tives to respond to programmatic interests of citizens.
Weak parties have few patronage resources to attract voters
and party members (e.g., finance, access to public jobs,
campaign support, etc.). Local politicians must therefore
build their political reputations and re-election chances
by responding to community needs. In this way, the scar-
city of party resources may create conditions that are more
favorable for local democratic accountability.
How does partisan accountability function within
mayoral recalls? The recall is a formal institution of dem-
ocratic accountability designed to sanction poor perform-
ing mayors. In practice, however, strong parties can use
patronage to remove mayors for reasons unrelated to policy
performance. For instance, if a mayor is disloyal to central
party interests, then party officials could punish this co-
partisan mayor by trying to recall him from office. If a
party loyalist replaces the ousted mayor, then the party
cements control over the municipal government. Strong
parties could similarly benefit by recalling mayors from
rival parties and replacing them with party loyalists. How-
ever, formal rules normally prevent higher level politicians
from recalling mayors, so party officials must convince
local politicians to do their bidding. Party officials thus
wield patronage rewards and punishments to convince local
co-partisans to recall mayors for partisan interests rather
than citizen interests. By circumventing formal rules in this
manner, strong parties promote partisan accountability over
democratic accountability.
To summarize, parties aim to maximize political and
economic power. One strategy parties pursue to achieve
this goal is to control mayoral positions throughout a coun-
try. Strong parties build patronage networks to support this
goal and strategy. Organizational and electoral resources
provide central party officials with patronage incentives to
punish members for disloyal behavior and to reward party
loyalty. The result is partisan accountability, a situation in
which the accountability of local politicians to central party
officials trumps accountability to their own constituents.
Strong parties therefore recall mayors to increase political
control over subnational units rather than to sanction
mayors for poor policy performance. This theoretical
framework leads to the following hypotheses:
H1: Strong parties recall mayors because of partisan
interests more than because of poor governance.
H2: Weak parties recall mayors because of poor govern-
ance or non-partisan reasons.
H3: When mayors are recalled from office, strong par-
ties take over new mayoral positions.
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Decentralization
and party politics
I apply my theory to Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter:
BiH). BiH is an illiberal, post-conflict democracy in which
most parties are non-programmatic and have an exclusive
ethnic orientation. Informal rules are prevalent in BiH and
have been found to undermine local democratic perfor-
mance (Pickering and Jusić, 2018). In 2004, BiH’s two
regional entities reformed their laws to allow citizens to
elect mayors directly and to recall them from office.
Although international actors were deeply involved in
designing BiH’s political institutions and promoting demo-
cratic governance after the Bosnian war in the 1990s, both
entity laws on direct mayoral elections and recalls were not
imposed by international authorities (Council of Europe,
2004; OSCE/ODIHR, 2005). This reform therefore serves
as an example of a progressive institution of local direct
democracy that ruling parties ostensibly designed to constrain
themselves. Furthermore, the division of the country into two
highly autonomous entities whose party systems and ethnic
composition differ, enables me to consider alternate explana-
tions based on party competition and ethnic diversity.
BiH began its democratic transition in 1995 with the
Dayton Peace Agreement. Dayton concentrated constitu-
tional powers in BiH’s two ethno-federal entities rather
than at the state level. These entities, the Federation of BiH
(Federation or FBiH) and the Republika Srpska (RS) estab-
lish laws that regulate municipal governments in their
respective entities. Beginning in 2004, the RS and FBiH
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legislatures changed their election laws for citizens to
directly elect mayors,2 while municipal councilors contin-
ued to be elected by PR through open lists.3 The laws also
introduced a mechanism to recall mayors, consisting of
three successive stages. Further details on each stage are
available in Online Appendix 7:
1. Initiation by a citizen petition signed by 10% of
residents OR by one-third of municipal councilors.
2. Local Referendum in which citizens vote in favor or
against the recall, determined by a simple majority.
3. Early election in which citizens vote for a new
mayor, elected by first-past-the-post.
Figure 1 displays BiH’s decentralized structure. Below
the central state level, FBiH and RS accommodate different
ethnic groups, while Brčko District is a multi-ethnic muni-
cipality. FBiH is further divided into ten cantons and con-
tains 79 municipalities in total, while the RS is centralized
with 63 municipalities. Due to its ethno-federal, power-
sharing structure, BiH’s party system contains three sub-
systems. Bosniak and Croat parties mainly compete for
power in the Federation. Serb parties mainly compete in
the RS, in which ethnic Serbs comprise 80% of the popu-
lation.4 Table A.1 in Online Appendix 1 displays the main
parties in the RS with seat shares in the RS National
Assembly and governing status of parties. Close seat shares
between the main governing and opposition parties, stable
coalitions, and Serb affiliation of all relevant parties indi-
cate that the RS party system is competitive, stable, and
ethnically homogenous.
By contrast, Table A.2 in Online Appendix 1 shows that
FBiH has a more complex system in which parties compete
for the electoral support of one ethnic group but must form
cross-ethnic coalitions once in office. Party competition
among Bosniak parties is vibrant with alternation of gov-
erning parties and close seat shares compared to the Croat
subsystem, in which HDZ is the dominant party but has
needed coalition support from smaller Croat parties to
maintain its dominance. Overall, inter-party competition
in the Federation is more volatile and fragmented compared
to the RS, leading to difficulties in coalition-building, as
well as unpredictable and unstable coalitions that have
shifted within terms. Accordingly, existing literature would
predict that greater party system stability and the lack of
ethnic diversity in the RS would support democratic per-
formance (Miguel, 2004; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005). Find-
ing similar patterns of partisan accountability in both
entities would suggest that my theory is not dependent on
the idiosyncrasies of a particular party system, ethnic com-
position, or the degree of administrative centralization.
Measuring political accountability and
party strength
Dependent variable: Local political accountability
The aim of the empirical analysis is to determine whether
strong parties use partisan accountability to recall mayors.
As a first step, we must separate the dependent variable,
political accountability, from the explanatory variable,
party strength. To do this, I create a typology of account-
ability based on recall initiation, shown in Table 1. The
typology has two dimensions: nature of conflict and type
of actor leading the recall initiation. Putnam described
democratic institutional performance as government
responsiveness and effectiveness toward citizens through
policy processes, pronouncements and implementation
(Putnam et al., 1993). My typology follows Putnam by
capturing whether conflicts center on the mayor’s public
policy outputs or initiators’ political interests. Recalls ini-
tiated because of dissatisfaction with public policies
respond to broad citizen interests and correspond to pro-
grammatic linkage, thus supporting democratic account-
ability. By contrast, recalls motivated by narrow political
interests of a group are not programmatic and thus under-
mine democratic accountability. The rows describe the
actor leading recall initiation. Formal rules require citizens
or municipal council members to initiate recalls. However,
official records show that citizens did not initiate any recall,






Figure 1. Decentralization in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Table 1. Modes of accountability in recall initiations.
Nature of Conflict
Political (non-programmatic linkage) Policy Output (programmatic linkage)
Initiator Municipal Councilors Local Power Struggle (6 cases) Indirect Democratic Accountability (2 cases)
Central Party Officials Partisan Accountability (18 cases) Policy Correction (0 cases)
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politicians interfering in several recalls (e.g., Center for
Civil Initiatives, 2009; US Embassy, 2007).
The cells in Table 1 correspond to four modes of
accountability. The top-right cell indicates indirect demo-
cratic accountability in which municipal councilors initiate
recalls against poor-performing mayors, thus acting as
agents of citizens. In the bottom right cell, central party
officials lead initiations against poor-performing mayors
as a form of policy correction. Although this does not fol-
low formal rules, one could imagine an exceptional situa-
tion in which citizens and municipal councilors are unable
to sanction a mayor due to collective action problems or
repression. The top-left cell implies that municipal counci-
lors initiate due to a local power struggle with the mayor.
Finally, the bottom-left cell corresponds to partisan
accountability in which central party officials interfere for
partisan reasons. The partisan accountability cases invert
the principal-agent relationship whereby central party offi-
cials act as principals and municipal councilors serve as
their agents.
In total, 26 recalls were initiated between 2005 and
2015, out of 451 mayoral mandates.5 I hand-coded quanti-
tative and qualitative data for every initiated recall to iden-
tify the initiators and nature of conflict, according to three
criteria: 1. Did a higher-level politician incite or interfere in
the recall? 2. Does the balance of evidence point more
toward poor policy performance or political conflict? Dou-
ble check that cases identified as “local power struggle”
were limited to the mayor, municipal councilors, and/or
local notables. 3. What are the party affiliations of the
mayor and municipal councilors who initiated the recall?
If evidence for any of the above steps was unclear, then I
verified the coding with a third party who was familiar with
the case (journalist, civil society representative, or indepen-
dent political expert). The above information was cross-
checked with multiple sources and no source contradicted
the information I present. Recall data include official deci-
sions and electoral results from the archives of BiH’s Cen-
tral Election Commission; more than 100 print and
televised media reports; NGO reports and U.S. diplomatic
cables; and 60 personal interviews.6
Strikingly, Table 1 shows that only two cases support
local democratic accountability, whereas 24 undermined
democracy. Municipal councilors initiated eight recalls
without interference from higher-level politicians. In 18
cases, however, qualitative evidence indicates that central
politicians used partisan accountability to co-opt municipal
councilors into initiating recalls. An objection might be
raised that recalls, even if prompted by central politicians,
are not necessarily inimical to local democracy. However,
it is clear both theoretically and empirically that almost all
cases do undermine democracy. Theoretically, it is difficult
to imagine that the involvement of national-level politi-
cians supports the decision-making autonomy of municipal
council members and do not influence citizens in recall
referenda. This theoretical notion is supported empirically.
In what follows, I demonstrate this proposition by cross-
checking multiple qualitative data sources for each individ-
ual case. It is remarkable that the wide variety of data
sources concur that in most cases, national politicians
directed municipal council members to initiate recalls for
political gain rather than to remove mayors whose policies
were harmful to their local communities. This strategy fol-
lows national party politics in BiH in which central party
interests focus on developing patronage systems rather than
ideological concerns (Hulsey and Keil, 2020).
Independent variable: Party strength
Party strength refers to the extensiveness of a party’s orga-
nizational and electoral resources. To measure this vari-
able, I combine indicators for party finance, local branch
networks, municipal electoral results, and RS and Federa-
tion electoral results. Table 2 presents data for each indi-
cator and an overall measure of party strength. The sample
consists of all major parties in BiH, including parties that
won at least five mayoral mandates and all parties involved
in recall initiations.
Party finance is the party’s average annual income from
2012 to 2015, in constant 2010 euros. I choose this period
because it comprises a full political budget cycle and some
parties did not exist prior to 2012. Party finance ranges
from a low of approximately 300 euros per year to a high
of two million euros per year. The data was collected from
the Central Election Commission of BiH’s (CEC) annual
review of political party financial reports.7 To measure
local party networks, I count the total number of munici-
palities in which a party fielded candidates for local coun-
cils in 2012. Table 2 shows that local party networks range
between 7 and 112. As a robustness check, I compared
these numbers to local branches reported by the CEC in
2005 and 2015, which suggest that local party networks
appear to be relatively stable during this period.
Electoral data cover municipal elections and RS and
FBiH legislative elections. It includes the total number of
mayoral mandates that each party won between 2004 and
2015.8 Second, I include the number of municipal council
seats each party won in 2012. As with the local network
data, I include mandates won as part of a pre-electoral
coalition. Next, I calculate the average number of seats a
party won in the RS or FBiH (lower house) legislature in
the 2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014 general elections. Data
sources are listed in Online Appendix 5.
Table A.3 in Online Appendix 1 shows the correlations
between the five indicators described above, most of which
are above 0.50 and statistically significant. To combine
these indicators into an overall, latent measure of party
strength, I conducted a principal component analysis
(PCA). The PCA results showed that 83.3% of the variance
can be explained by one dimension. The last column in
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table A.3 presents the factor loadings, which show that each
indicator is close in importance. The final column in Table 2
presents party strength scores for each individual party,
which range from 2.59 to 4.65 with a median of 0.86.
These scores have been scaled and centered so that negative
values correspond to weak parties, whereas positive values
correspond to strong parties. The scores confirm common
knowledge that in the Republika Srpska, SNSD and SDS
are the two strongest parties at 3.00 and 1.79. In the Fed-
eration, the strongest parties are SDA, SDP, and HDZ with
scores of 4.65, 2.54, and 0.93.
Structure of empirical analysis
The empirical goal is to uncover whether strong parties use
partisan accountability to initiate recalls and to explain how
this strategy subverts local democratic accountability. For
each recall initiated, I map accountability type (democratic
accountability, local power struggle, and partisan account-
ability) onto the party affiliations of mayors and initiators.
Next, I analyze qualitative data to explain the patterns of
conflict leading to recalls and to justify the type of account-
ability I identify for each case. I then use quantitative data
on party strength to conduct a series of t-tests that compare
party strength scores between parties that used partisan
accountability with parties that did not use partisan
accountability, as well as comparing the strength of
mayors’ parties with parties that initiated recalls.
I then analyze recall success, meaning whether initiation
led to the removal of mayors from office. Evidence that
strong parties that initiate recalls then become successors to
incumbent mayors would support my claim that strong
parties are successful in using partisan accountability to
consolidate political power over subnational units. By con-
trast, I expect weak parties to lack the resources to meddle
into the affairs of local governments, so a lack of partisan
interference by weak parties in recalls would also support
my hypotheses.
Results: How partisan conflicts lead to
mayoral recalls
Table 3 maps recall initiations onto accountability type
(rows) and party affiliation of the initiators (columns). The
first row presents two recalls that follow democratic
accountability. These two recalls centered on the quality
of governance, as the mayor’s poor policy performance led
municipal councilors from different parties to band
together and initiate the recalls. The other recalls were
driven by one party and do not follow a pattern of demo-
cratic accountability. The middle row shows that six cases
involved a power struggle between councilors and the
mayor, and higher-level politicians were not directly
involved. The bottom row displays 18 cases that follow
partisan accountability in which central party officials
directed municipal councilors to initiate against mayors
who were unfavorable to party interests.
The first column displays five intra-party conflicts in
which councilors initiated recalls against mayors from their
own parties. The second column displays cases where the
initiators came from a different party than the mayor, which
served to extend electoral competition. The next sections
discuss these patterns of conflict and partisanship, begin-
ning with intra-party recalls (column 1) and continuing to
Table 2. Party strength indicators and PCA score.
Party Ethnic Pillar Finance Local Networks Local Seats Mayors Entity Seats PCA Score
SDA Bosniak 2,289,508 103 532 122 28 4.65
SNSD Serb 1,204,127 81 378 92 32 3.00
SDP Bosniak* 2,202,635 112 311 32 18 2.54
SDS Serb 885,750 65 317 88 21 1.79
HDZ Croat 1,015,767 66 261 56 12 0.93
SBB Bosniak 786,038 79 142 2 15 0.13
SBiH Bosniak 468,374 79 133 9 13 0.12
PDP Serb 325,625 60 121 2 8 0.84
NSRzB Croat 329,128 86 68 1 3 0.88
DNS Serb 324,542 62 119 7 5 0.91
NDP Serb 99,056 57 84 2 5 1.29
SP Serb 252,389 56 65 7 3 1.31
HDZ 1990 Croat 331,294 37 91 8 5 1.35
HSS-NHI Croat 59,031 31 37 3 6 1.79
ZSD Serb 310 7 2 2 0 2.59
SNS Serb 18,582 43 29 1 0 1.97
Min. 310 7 2 1 0 2.59
Max. 2,289,508 112 532 122 32 4.65
Median 330,211 64 120 7 7 0.86
*SDP is officially multi-ethnic but mainly appeals to moderate Bosniaks.
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inter-party recalls (column 2). Following this, I compare
the 18 cases of partisan accountability with the six cases of
local power struggles and two cases of democratic
accountability.
Recalls as punishment: Intra-party conflict and
maintaining political control
Column one in Table 3 shows that five intra-party conflicts
led the mayor’s own party to initiate recalls. Two of these
cases occurred in FBiH while three occurred in the RS. The
data show that councilors from the strongest party in FBiH
and RS (SDA and SNSD, respectively) initiated all recalls
against their co-partisan mayors. Case D, which took place
in Bosanska Krupa, is the lone intra-party conflict without
interference from higher level politicians. In this conflict,
local party factions pit the mayor against co-partisan
municipal councilors, but the mayor survived the referen-
dum stage.9
The other four cases follow partisan accountability.
Central party officials from strong parties sought to punish
dissident mayors by directing co-partisan municipal coun-
cilors to initiate recalls. Evidence from case J in Kneževo
suggests a feud between the mayor and president of SNSD,
who supported the recall and accused the mayor of misus-
ing public office. This recall failed the referendum stage
since a majority of citizens voted against the recall.10 After
switching parties, the mayor won re-election in 2008 and
2012. However, the mayor faced two more recall initia-
tives, again led by SNSD, and was eventually removed
from office in 2015.11 In case L, Vlasenica, SNSD counci-
lors initiated the recall against a popular mayor whom the
party president labeled as disloyal. The recall failed as the
Central Election Commission found the process of absentee
voting in the referendum to be illegal (US Embassy, 2007).
Municipal councilors then appealed directly to the party
president (who also served as Prime Minister of Republika
Srpska) to resolve the matter.12 Case R took place in
Banovići and case Y in Milići, municipalities with valuable
natural resources (coal and bauxite mining, respectively).
Both mayors were removed from office after they came
into conflict with powerful economic notables who control
these mining companies and who have strong ties to the
central leadership of the mayor’s party.13 R and Y are
distinct because of the massive economic resources and
political connections that the two economic notables wield
in these municipalities. These resources and connections
enabled them to co-opt municipal councilors to initiate
recalls and to coerce citizens in recall referenda, resulting
in the removal of both mayors.
The evidence from intra-party recalls demonstrates that
high-level party officials (either the party president or a
local notable with direct ties to the central party leadership)
instrumentally used the recall mechanism to punish dis-
loyal, co-partisan mayors. Additional qualitative data,
listed in Online Appendices 5 and 6, indicate that these
four mayors were popular with their constituents and had
several policy successes to their credit. Yet these four recall
initiations led to the revocation of the mayors’ party mem-
bership and the removal of two mayors from office, which
severely damaged their political careers. To address polit-
ical competition as an alternative explanation, intra-party
recalls are not associated with the degree of local compe-
tition, as the mayor’s margin of victory over the second-
place candidate in the previous election ranges from 1 to 51
percentage points. Case R is included in Online Appendix 2
as a case study to detail how party officials use partisan
accountability to punish competent and popular mayors
who put community interests ahead of party interests. The
case shows how resources fuel partisan accountability and
enable party leaders to subvert formal procedures through
informal patronage practices. These practices help strong
parties to maintain political and economic control over
municipal resources and to deter disloyal behavior from
other party members.
Table 3. Partisanship and conflicts triggering recalls.
Which party initiates a recall?
Mayor’s Party Not Mayor’s Party Multiple Parties
Accountability Type Democratic Accountability quality of governance
(S, W)*
Local Power Struggle intra-party
factions (D)
inter-party competition
(A, E, I, M, Q)
Partisan Accountability intra-party
punishment
(J, L, R, Y)
inter-party competition
(B, C, F, G, H, K, N, O, P, T, U, V, X, Z)
*Individual cases in parentheses; full dataset available as Tables A.6 and A.7 in Online Appendix 1.
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Recalls as competition: Inter-party conflict and
extending political control
Column two in Table 3 shows that in 19 cases, the party
leading the recall initiation differed from the mayor’s party.
These parties attempted to extend electoral competition for
the mayorship. In five cases, competition manifested as
local power struggles between mayors and municipal coun-
cilors without direct involvement from higher levels. These
local conflicts occurred in competitive environments in
which the mayor’s margin of victory in the previous elec-
tion was less than 10 percentage points.14 In the other 14
cases, central party officials used partisan accountability to
co-opt municipal councilors into initiating recalls against
mayors from rival parties.
Seven of these 14 partisan accountability cases involved
conflicts between the two strongest parties in the RS.
Shortly after defeating the formerly dominant SDS in the
RS general elections in 2006, SNSD initiated recalls
against SDS mayors in cases F, G, K, P, and U. Sources
describe these recalls as a low-risk strategy for SNSD to
gauge its political strength in traditional SDS stronghold
municipalities (US Embassy, 2007). In turn SDS led recall
initiatives in cases O and V against SNSD mayors. These
two strong parties also initiated six recalls in the RS against
mayors from weak parties. The lack of penalties for recall
failure therefore appear to incentivize parties to initiate
recalls. To further support the claim that strong parties used
partisan accountability to extend inter-party competition,
these recall initiations occurred in competitive municipali-
ties in which the mayor’s margin of victory has a mean of
7.15 percentage points and median of 6.98.15 In Online
Appendix 2, I include an in-depth study of case H to illus-
trate how partisan accountability functions in inter-party
conflicts.
The lack of inter-party recalls in the Federation com-
pared to the RS is striking and runs contrary to the party
system institutionalization literature. This literature would
expect the RS party system to be more supportive of dem-
ocratic accountability because electoral competition is
more stable than in FBiH. Instead, the findings suggest that
the RS’s mono-ethnic party system and centralized admin-
istrative structure facilitate national-level politicians to
penetrate municipal politics. By contrast, FBiH’s decentra-
lized and multi-ethnic structure, including ten cantonal
governments above the municipal level, increase costs for
party leaders to interfere in municipal politics. This finding
aligns with recent literature on subnational authoritarian-
ism in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which claims that the RS is
more autocratic than FBiH. For example, Kapidžić (2020)
argues that multi-level institutions and cross-ethnic checks
and balances constrain illiberal practices in FBiH, while
territorial autonomy and lack of ethnic power-sharing in
the RS foster autocratization. As a result, the fragmentation
of party systems and institutions in ethnically divided or
politically polarized contexts may help to counteract dem-
ocratic backsliding.
An alternative explanation might consider inter-party
recalls to enhance democratic accountability if the initiat-
ing party caters to the policy preferences of the local com-
munity. However, party cleavages in BiH are not based on
policy programs but rather on ethnicity and patronage jobs
(Hulsey and Keil, 2020). Furthermore, case C is the only
instance in which the initiating party was from a different
ethnic group than the mayor’s party. This means that in all
other cases, if a citizen favored the initiating party it is most
likely because she perceived the party to improve her
employment prospects rather than because the party had a
different policy orientation (see: Kurtović, 2016).
Party strength and accountability
In contrast to the recalls involving partisan accountability,
strong parties did not drive recalls triggered by local power
struggles or poor governance. The two democratic cases
were initiated by councilors from multiple parties without
any party clearly driving the initiation. These two cases are
the lone examples of party pluralism and were motivated by
dissatisfaction with the mayor’s policy outputs more than
by political strife.
Of the cases that do not follow partisan accountability,
case Q was a local power struggle between the mayor and a
powerful municipal councilor (both from weak parties) for
control over municipal property. The municipal councilor,
one of the wealthiest residents of the town, convinced his
co-partisans in the council to initiate the recall.16 Cases A,
I, and S occurred in Istočni Drvar against three different
individuals over an eight year period, each representing
different parties. Istočni Drvar is one of the smallest muni-
cipalities in the country with a rich logging industry. The
first two conflicts involved politicians who ran for mayor
and a local struggle for control over the municipality’s
wood processing plant.17 The third (case S), however,
appears to follow a more democratic mode of accountabil-
ity since it followed multiple policy failures by the mayor.
He refused to implement decisions of the municipal coun-
cils, had repeated infractions of local self-governance leg-
islation, and spent taxes from the forestry company that
were supposed to be allocated to the municipality’s
budget.18
Cases E, M, and W took place in Bosansko Grahovo.
Case E was a local power struggle between SDP and SP
municipal councilors. As some SDP councilors left their
party, SP councilors initiated a recall against the SDP
mayor who was now politically vulnerable. The recall
failed the referendum stage because BiH’s Central Election
Commission ruled that the procedure was illegal. The
municipal council appealed the decision and lost, but the
conflict between the council and the mayor continued until
the end of the mayor’s term with the council blocking the
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municipal budget proposed by the mayor.19 Case M was
also a local power struggle against a different mayor in his
first term. Led by the president of the municipal council
and another councilor, they furtively put the recall initiative
on the official agenda, but the mayor survived the referen-
dum.20 Case W occurred five years later against the same
mayor and follows a more democratic mode of account-
ability. By this time, the lack of public services and poor
socio-economic conditions had reached an unprecedented
level. The municipality’s bank account was blocked for not
paying the pension fund for its residents; there was no
regular garbage pickup, no healthcare services, and no sal-
aries for municipal employees. Evidence suggests that the
mayor bears some individual responsibility for the munici-
pality’s underdevelopment, since the cantonal prosecutor
later issued a criminal indictment against him for misusing
public funds while in office.21
To formally test the hypothesis that strong parties are
associated with partisan accountability more than weak
parties, I conducted a series of t-tests that compare differ-
ences in mean party strength scores for different samples
within the dataset. Table 4 summarizes the results of these
tests, and descriptive statistics for each sample are avail-
able in Tables A.4 and A.5 in Online Appendix 1. The first
test compares the partisan accountability cases with the
non-partisan accountability cases. The scores for parties
that initiated the 18 partisan accountability cases are all
positive with a mean of 2.86 and standard deviation of
0.64. By comparison, the mean score for parties that initi-
ated the other eight cases is numerically smaller at 0.21
with a standard deviation at 2.20. These values indicate that
weak parties are more associated with local power strug-
gles and democratic accountability, and that party strength
varies more in non-partisan accountability cases. I con-
ducted an independent samples t-test accounting for
unequal variance.22 The results show that parties that used
partisan accountability to initiate recalls are associated with
a significantly greater mean party strength score than par-
ties that did not use partisan accountability.
Looking within the cases of partisan accountability, the
second t-test compares party strength of the mayors’ parties
relative to the parties that initiated recalls. The scores of the
mayors’ parties vary greatly from 1.97 to 4.65 with a
mean of 1.25 and standard deviation of 2.24. By contrast,
the party strength scores for the parties that initiated these
recalls are all above zero, with a mean score that is numeri-
cally greater at 2.70 and a smaller standard deviation at
0.51. The differences in these scores indicate that mayors
from both strong and weak parties faced recalls; however,
strong parties exclusively led these recall initiations. The
results of the independent samples t-test with unequal var-
iance confirm that on average, the initiating parties are
significantly stronger than the mayor’s party.23
The third test looks at the non-partisan accountability
cases: local political struggles and democratic accountabil-
ity. The mean party strength score for the initiating parties
(0.91) was negative and numerically lower than the mean
score for the mayor’s party (0.84). The scores demonstrate
that weak parties initiated these recalls, often against
mayors from strong parties. To test whether mayors’ parties
and initiating parties in these cases are associated with
statistically different mean party strength scores, I again
performed an independent samples t-test but did not find
a statistically significant effect.24 Thus, we cannot reject
the null hypothesis that the difference in mean party
strength scores between initiating parties and the mayors’
parties is significantly different from zero. This result sup-
ports the notion that party strength is not a key factor to
explain recalls involving local power struggles and poor
governance.
Taken together, these tests support the hypothesis that
strong parties use partisan accountability to initiate recalls
and are less associated with other modes of accountability.
Furthermore, the qualitative analysis has shown that in 24
of 26 cases, recalls do not support democratic accountabil-
ity. Moreover, no recall was initiated through a citizen
petition and only two of 26 recalls were initiated because
of policy outputs that harmed citizens. The other 24 cases
were initiated for political interests and undermined the
accountability of mayors to citizens. Strong parties led
initiation efforts 18 times due to an intra-party or inter-
party conflict. Using partisan accountability as their key
strategy, central party officials from these parties activated
their patronage networks to punish disloyal mayors from
their own ranks or to dislodge mayors from rival parties. By
contrast, in seven of eight cases that relate to poor govern-
ance or were restricted to local-level conflicts, strong par-
ties did not drive recall initiations.
Table 4. Differences in mean party strength scores.
Comparison Groups Difference in Means Standard Error t p value
Initiating Parties (non-partisan
accountability)
Initiating Parties (partisan accountability) 3.07 0.79 3.87 0.005
Mayor’s Party (partisan
accountability)
Initiating Party (partisan accountability) 1.13 0.54 2.10 0.048
Mayor’s Party (non-partisan
accountability)
Initiating Party (non-partisan accountability) 1.52 1.25 1.22 0.243
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Extending party control: Referenda and early mayoral
elections
After recalls are initiated, did strong parties successfully
remove mayors and replace them with their preferred can-
didates? Table A.7 in Online Appendix 1 shows that ten of
26 initiations, or 39%, passed the referendum stage and
resulted in the removal of the mayor. Table 5 shows every
recall in which the mayor was removed from office and
confirms that in each case, parties that led recall initiations
also won early mayoral elections to cement control over
municipal governments. Seven of the ten successful cases,
or 70%, were initiated by strong parties who used partisan
accountability. On the other hand, weak parties were suc-
cessful in three cases (A, I, and S), or 30%. However, if we
condition the rate of recall success on the number of recall
attempts, then the rate for strong parties drops to seven out
of 19 initiations, or 37%, whereas the success rate for weak
parties jumps to 60%. These rates suggest that strong par-
ties are more successful at removing mayors because they
initiate recalls more frequently.
Why do strong parties initiate recalls more frequently
and what does this mean for local democracy? Institutional
rules—specifically the low threshold required to initiate
and the lack of penalties for recall failure—incentivize
strong parties to initiate.25 Since strong parties have greater
organizational and electoral capacities to initiate recalls
than weak parties, it pays off for strong parties to attempt
to recall mayors. These attempts, however, incur costs to
the municipality and its citizens, since they “poison the
local political environment and distract mayors and munic-
ipal councils from the task of governance” (US Embassy,
2007). Furthermore, referenda deplete budgetary resources
and hold up public infrastructure projects.26 Such costs may
ultimately benefit the strong party that initiated a failed
recall by damaging the mayor’s reputation and making his
or her re-election more precarious. Case H demonstrates
this point. The recall referendum against the mayor failed,
but the mayor subsequently lost re-election after facing
years of slander and decision-making blockage by the
recall initiators.
Evidence from the referendum stage also suggests that
recalls often directly undermine democratic accountability.
Specifically, BiH’s Central Election Commission nullified
five recall referenda that violated democratic procedures
and affected voter turnout or the counting of ballots.27
Three of these decisions blocked strong parties from sub-
verting recalls in cases H, V, and X. The Commission
therefore safeguarded local democracy by identifying pro-
cedural irregularities. Furthermore, I used a classification
tree, which is a machine learning method, to identify polit-
ical variables that optimally predict recall success. The
results, included in Online Appendix 3, show that mayors
are more likely to be removed when fewer citizens vote in
recall referenda.
The results also show substantial differences between
the two regional entities which belie alternative explana-
tions. Although conventional wisdom would predict the
fragmented and volatile party system of FBiH to be more
at risk of undermining democratic performance, most
recalls occurred in the RS. Moreover, only one of the
recalls in FBiH was successful. This finding suggests that
greater party system consolidation and the centralized
administrative structure of the RS is more conducive for
partisan accountability. The ten cantonal governments in
FBiH, on the other hand, may strain the ability of central
party leaders to control local actors. In addition, the com-
petitive but volatile Bosniak subsystem may inhibit recalls
by making it difficult for parties to identify whether mayors
from different parties are allies or rivals. The Croat sub-
system—the least competitive in which HDZ has main-
tained its hegemony during the entire period—
experienced only one recall that involved two weaker par-
ties. The findings therefore challenge the party competition
literature; however, they support local scholarship arguing
that the RS’s mono-ethnic party system fosters subnational
authoritarianism (e.g., Kapidžić, 2020). Furthermore,
FBiH’s fragmented political system (in terms of ethnic
power-sharing, two ethnic party subsystems, and multi-
level institutions) place more barriers for leaders to conso-
lidate political power, thereby inhibiting autocratization.
Interestingly, I find scant evidence that ethnicity plays a
role in partisan conflict. In the 19 recalls that were initiated
due to inter-party conflicts, case C was the only instance in
which incumbent and initiating parties represented differ-
ent ethnic groups, and the conflict centered on establishing
political control.28
Discussion
When BiH’s regional entities reformed their electoral laws
in 2004 to allow citizens to directly elect their mayors and
recall poor-performing ones, international governmental
Table 5. Recalls that led to the removal of mayors.







A 2005 RS Local 2.59 Yes
C 2007 RS Partisan 3.00 Yes
F 2007 RS Partisan 3.00 Yes
G 2007 RS Partisan 3.00 Yes
I 2007 RS Local 1.31 Yes
O 2011 RS Partisan 1.79 Yes
P 2011 RS Partisan 3.00 Yes
R 2014 FBiH Partisan 4.65 Yes
S 2015 RS Democratic 0.62 Yes
Y 2015 RS Partisan 3.00 Yes
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organizations hailed this achievement as an institutional
reform that would strengthen local democracy (Council
of Europe, 2004; OSCE/ODIHR, 2005). Yet more than a
decade later, the evidence shows that the same parliamen-
tary parties which created this institutional mechanism
have subverted its original purpose. Most often mayoral
recalls do not reflect poor policy performance but are
instead used instrumentally by national-level politicians
from dominant parties. These parties initiate recalls to pun-
ish disloyal, co-partisan mayors who put their communities
above central party interests. These parties also use recalls
to extend electoral competition against vulnerable mayors
from rival parties. Consistent with classic literature on eth-
nic party systems (Horowitz, 2000; Mitchell, 1995), the
subversion of local democratic accountability takes place
within ethnic enclaves rather than between politicians or
parties representing different ethnic groups.
Although weak parties are not immune from abusing
recalls for political gain, they do so less frequently and
national-level politicians from these parties have not pres-
sured municipal councilors to initiate recalls. The analysis
has therefore shown that extensive organizational
resources, combined with weak institutional rules, pro-
vide pernicious incentives and capacities for dominant,
national parties to stifle subnational democratization. In
this regard, the RS updated its law on local self-
governance in 2016 so that the RS legislature may dis-
solve a municipal council if it initiates a recall but the
recall referendum fails. It would be interesting to evaluate
whether this amendment reduces the number of recall
attempts by comparing the current findings with a subse-
quent ten-year period.
By applying patron-client politics inside of parties, this
work has connected party organizational resources to the
subversion of local democratic accountability. Partisan
accountability also extends beyond recalls. In BiH the strat-
egy can be easily traced to other types of intra-party punish-
ments against mayors, such as forced resignations,
politically motivated criminal indictments, and demotions
and revocations of party membership. Beyond Bosnia and
Herzegovina, strong parties in other post-communist coun-
tries—notably Fidesz in Hungary, VMRO-DPMNE in
North Macedonia, and SNS in Serbia—have also aggran-
dized power by strategically subverting democratic
institutions.
In the future, it would be informative to establish more
precise scope conditions for partisan accountability. The
subversion of democratic institutions by elected leaders is
a widespread challenge facing electoral democracies
across the globe (Bermeo, 2016; Waldner and Lust,
2018). Partisan accountability is one strategy of demo-
cratic subversion that strong party organizations may pur-
sue in weak institutional environments. Yet the forms of
institutional weakness and causes of non-compliance with
institutional rules are various (Brinks et al., 2019).
Furthermore, we know little about how party resources
interact with institutional weakness in competitive party
systems. Which kinds of organizational resources lead
parties to support democratic institutions and public pol-
icies rather than to subvert them? What types of institu-
tional rules constrain parties from usurping power?
Comparing how party resources, electoral competition,
and partisan accountability function in different party sys-
tems and institutional contexts could therefore help us to
understand which aspects of political competition lead
parties to establish programmatic over non-
programmatic linkages with citizens.
Acknowledgements
The author thanks Suad Arnautović and the Central Election
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Notes
1. This definition follows Stokes (2005: 316).
2. Previously, municipal councilors selected mayors, so mayors
usually represented the party with the greatest seat share in
the council. In 2004, RS mayors were selected by first-past-
the-post while FBiH used a preferential voting system that
was changed to first-past-the-post in 2008.
3. Citizens may vote for individual candidates within a single
party list and/or a party list. Seats are allocated by Sainte-
Laguë and parties must obtain at least 3% of total votes.
Individual candidates win seats according to the number of
personal votes they receive if above 5% of the total party vote
(amended to 10% in 2016). Remaining seats are allocated by
candidate rankings within party lists. See: Kapidžić (2016).
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4. For more on BiH’s party system, see: Hulsey and Keil (2020);
Mujagić and Arnautović (2016).
5. Recalls were legally adopted in 2004 and may not take place
during a local election year (2004, 2008, and 2016).
6. Data sources are listed in Online Appendices 5–6. The data
include every recall that passed the recall initiation stage.
Data on proposed recalls that did not pass initiation were not
reliable enough to include, though their absence may bias my
results.
7. “Izvještaji o izvršenoj reviziji.” Available at: http://izbori.ba/
Default.aspx?CategoryID¼61&Lang¼3&Mod¼4. I checked
2005 annual income for parties that existed at the time, and
parties are ranked in the same relative order. Income
increased for all parties from 2005 until 2012, except for
SBiH, whose annual income has declined.
8. This includes 2004, 2008, and 2012 election winners plus off-
year elections between 2004 and 2015 due to recalls, deaths,
and resignations.
9. The conflict was over the formation of a cantonal coalition
which the mayor supported but initiating councilors opposed
(Center for Civil Initiatives 2009:42; Dnevni Avaz (2007)
SDA, SBiH, SDP, BPS, SDU i SPU protiv opoziva načelnika
[SDA, SBiH, BPS, SDU and SPU against recall of mayor], 10
March).
10. Dnevni Avaz (2008) Odluka o smjeni je politička farsa [Deci-
sion on replacement is a political farce], 28 January. Maunaga
G (2008) Bore Škeljić ostaje načelnik [Bore Škeljić remains
mayor]. Nezavisne Novine, 19 February.
11. The other initiations against this mayor are cases U and X.
12. MG (2006) Dodik potvrdio odluku o smjeni [Dodik con-
firmed decision on removal]. Nezavisne Novine, 25 Febru-
ary; Odbornici zatražili pomoć premijera RS [Councilors
seek help from RS Prime Minister]. Oslobodēnje, 27 March
2007.
13. Anonymous, 2016, personal interview; Avdić A (2018)
Pobuna u SDA Utvrdi: Ko je Mirsad Kukić, vladar iz pod-
zemlja i miljenik Izetbegovića? [Who is Mirsad Kukić, ruler
from the underworld and Izetbegović’s favorite?]. Žurnal, 18
February; OSCE Senior Political Officer, 2015, personal
interview; RTVBN (2015) Zašto Jurošević smeta Rajku
Dukiću? [Why does Jurošević bother Rajko Dukić], 18 June.
14. This finding is consistent with Holland and Incio, who find
mayoral recalls in Peru to be restricted to local politics and
initiated most often by losing mayoral candidates in compet-
itive municipalities.
15. By contrast the mean for non-interparty conflict is 16.37 and
median is 9.83.
16. SM (2010) Stanovnici Usore glasaju o povjerenju općinskom
načelniku Anti Čičku [Usora residents vote on trust for Mayor
Ante Čičak]. Slobodna Bosna, 3 June; MI. B (2010) Povjer-
enje načelniku Usore [Trust in the mayor of Usora]. Oslobo-
dēnje, 8 June.
17. PK (2005) Opoziv načelnika ostaje neriješen [Recall of
mayor remains unresolved]. Nezavisne Novine, 14 Septem-
ber; Šikanjić T (2007) Glasalo duplo više birača nego lani
[Twice as many voters voted as last year]. Nezavisne Novine,
8 July.
18. Šajnović D (2014) Opozvan načelnik Dragan Lukač [Mayor
Dragan Lukač recalled]. Nezavisne Novine, 19 August.
19. Oslobodēnje (2007) Zbog samovolje smijenjen načelnik
općine [Because of arbitrariness the mayor was fired], 20
May; Oslobodēnje (2007) Žalba Sudu zbog odluke Centralne
izborne komisije [Appeal to court because of Central Elec-
tion Commission’s decision], 21 August; Nezavisne Novine
(2008) Politička kriza do lokalnih izbora [Political crisis until
local elections], 19 January.
20. SRNA (2010) Nelegalna odluka o pokretanju postupka opo-
ziva [Illegal decision on recall initiation]. Nezavisne Novine,
22 January.
21. Livno Plus (2015) Vijećnici u B. Grahovu pokrenuli postupak
opoziva aktualnog načelnika [Councilors began recall initia-
tion of current mayor], 27 June; Office of Canton 10 Prose-
cutor, Potvrd̄ena optužnica protiv Uroša Makića, bivšeg
načelnika Općine Bosansko Grahovo [Confirmation of indict-
ment against Uros Makic, former mayor of the municipality
of Bosansko Grahovo], 23 May 2018. Available at: https://kt-
livno.pravosudje.ba/.
22. An F-test confirmed that the variances are unequal: F¼ 11.85
and p value equal to 0.00. The samples are sufficiently nor-
mally distributed with skewness and kurtosis below 2 and 9,
respectively (Schmider et al., 2010).
23. An F-test confirmed unequal variances: F ¼ 19.15 with 13
degrees of freedom and p value equal to 0.00. The samples
are sufficiently normally distributed: skewness and kurtosis
for mayors’ party scores are 0.02 and 1.78; for initiating
parties they are 1.23 and 2.65, respectively.
24. An F-test did not reject the null hypothesis that the two var-
iances are equal: F ¼ 5.77 with 6 degrees of freedom and p
value equal to 0.051. Assuming equal or unequal variances
did not change the results.
25. E.g.: Vidačković N (2015) Odbornicima kazne za kočenje
skupštine [Penalties for councilors for breaking the council].
Nezavisne Novine, 17 November; Vukić U (2015) Veći cen-
zus spas za lokalnu vlast [A bigger census, savior for local
government]. Nezavisne Novine, 3 November.
26. Vukić U (2015) Lokalni referendumi samo prazne kase
[Local referendums only empty cash registers]. Nezavisne
Novine, 30 June; Nezavisne Novine (2008) Referendum
zaustavio projekte [Referendum halted projects], 4
January.
27. Reports of illegal voting also occurred in Case A but the CEC
confirmed that the mayor was removed from office.
28. Case C occurred in Osmaci, one of three municipalities in
the RS without an ethnic Serb majority. SNSD formed a
local coalition with other Serb councilors from PDP, SDS,
SP, and the Serbian Radical Party against a Bosniak mayor
from SDA. Serb councilors took advantage of a new voter
registration loophole that prevented Bosniak voters from
voting in absentia. The referendum was boycotted by Bos-
niaks, and the mayor was removed from office (A.H. (2006)
12 Party Politics XX(X)
Srbi traže referendum kako bi smijenili načelnika Edina
Ramića [Serbs seek referendum to replace mayor Edin
Ramić]. Oslobodēnje, 5 November; J.Š. (2006) Grad̄ani
izglasali opoziv načelnika [Residents vote to recall mayor].
Nezavisne novine, 14 November; E.H. (2006) Ramić: Ovo
je nastavak etničkog čišćenja [Ramić: This is the continua-
tion of ethnic cleansing]. Dnevni Avaz, 15 November).
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